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Abstract
In a federal state, political leaders of constituent units might protect their enter-
prises from the federal center (e.g., allowing them not to pay federal taxes). The
eﬀectiveness of such protection depends crucially on the ability of local authorities to
extract rents from enterprises. They can easily do so, if there is a small number of
enterprises with large employment, and local monopolies can be eﬀectively sustained.
They cannot do it so easily if regional industry is competitive, political opposition is
strong, and the federal center has enough means to enforce payment of taxes. We
build a simple model to argue that it is the industrial structure of constituent units
that determines political relations between them and the federal center. The theory is
supported by the recent experience of Russia, China, and Argentina.
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during 2000-01 academic year, seminar participants in Columbia University and University of Chicago, and
to Richard Ericson, Scott Gehlbach, Philip Keefer, Roger Myerson, John Nye, Yingyi Qian, Gerard Roland,
Andrei Shleifer, Alexandra Vacroux, Barry Weingast, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya for helpful comments.
11 Introduction
In a federal state, political leaders of constituent units might protect their enterprises from
the federal center. Though such protection is sometimes beneﬁcial, the recent experience of
Russia, Argentina and some other large federations shows that it might do much more harm
than good. The willingness to protect depends crucially on the ability of local authorities to
extract rents from enterprises. They can easily do so if there is a small number of enterprises
with large employment, and local monopolies could be eﬀectively sustained. They would have
much more trouble extracting rents if regional industry is competitive, political opposition
is strong, and the federal center has enough means to enforce payment of taxes. This paper
aims to cast light on the interaction of political institutions and economic performance of a
federalist system at the micro level, both inside and outside the modern developed world.
Today, there are two large de-facto federal states in transition from command to market
economies, China and Russia.1 Until recently, the results of these transitions have been pro-
foundly diﬀerent. Why in one of these countries has market-preserving federalism (Qian and
Weingast, 1995, Weingast, 1995) developed, while the other country is stuck with market-
destroying federalism? What are the speciﬁc features of Russian federalism that distinguish
Russia from other federal states? Blanchard and Shleifer (2000) note that a crucial diﬀer-
ence between Russia and China’s transition to market economy is that Russia entered the
transition as a heavily industrialized economy, while China had a relatively few large enter-
prises. Our paper argues that this diﬀerence lies at the core of Russia’ federalism failure:
the possibility to extract rents and political support from existing enterprises in exchange
for protection against the federal center results in the suppression of intra-regional com-
petition and promotes soft-budget constraints for managers. Ericson (1999) notes that “
... there seems to have developed a symbiosis, particularly at the regional and local levels,
between governments and important businesses that goes well beyond what one would see
were relations intermediated by law and law-structured markets.” This translates into re-
gions’ relationshi p wi th the federal center, whe re “p erhaps the most s igni ﬁcant characteri s ti c
of federalism, Russian style, is the striking lack of cooperation between center and regions”
1By constitu tion, China is a unitary state. Howe ve r, it recently b ecame a m a j or example of m arket-
friendly federalist system (e.g. Montinola et al, 1995, Weingast, 2000).
2(de Figueredo and Weingast, 2001a).
There is an on-going discussion on what forms of federalism are more likely to foster eco-
nomic development (e.g., North, 1986, Weingast, 2000). Alesina, Angeloni, and Etro (2001)
view optimal federations as those that balance beneﬁts of centralization (internalization of
externalities) and beneﬁts of decentralization (adaptability to local conditions). Qian and
Weingast (1997) suggest that the main role a federalist system plays is that of a commit-
ment by the government to provide public goods and preserve market incentives. We do not
challenge this view in any way: we show how the actual performance of a de-jure federalist
system relies upon the industrial structure of sub-federal units of a federal country. Fed-
eralist arrangements that look the same in a written constitution might work well in rural
provinces in China, and be harmful in heavy industrialized regions in Russia. Careaga and
Weingast (2000) argue that it is not plausible to judge one federal system against another
solely on the basis of the level of decentralization. We extend this argument by noting that
the level of decentralization is not necessarily a matter of the center’s policy or a decision at a
certain point. Rather, many federal structures emerged to be far diﬀerent from those drafted
(and written about in books). For example, the Russian constitution places appointment of
judges in the federal jurisdiction (with the intent to assure their independence). Neverthe-
less, regional powers have actually almost unrestricted inﬂuence over the regional judiciary
in Russia. In contrast, according to China Security Commission Report to the US Congress
dated July 2002, over 90 percent of China’s approximately 180,000 judges are members of
the Communist Party, which makes them subordinated to the nation-wide structure.
In this paper, we develop a theory of provincial protectionism, and illustrate it with a
case study of the current federalist system in Russia. There is no argument about whether
or not the actual Russian federal system is bad for growth. It is indeed bad. As de Figueredo
and Weingast (2001a) put it: “Russia violates both the classical federal principles articulated
by Hayek, Musgrave, Oates, and Tiebout as well as those associated with market-preserving
federalism.” Instead, we focus on the origins of this federal structure and its persistence. In
particular, it appears that initial rent-holders managers of large and often ineﬃcient enter-
prises in the case of Russia, whose rents would be eliminated if a market-preserving federal
system were in place have strong incentives to oppose any positive development in federal re-
3lations. A detailed report of the McKinsey Research Institute (1999) on the Russian economy
stated that most fundamental micro regulatory factors are sector-level market distortions,
which by creating a non-level playing ﬁeld allow low-productivity companies in Russia to be
more proﬁtable (on a cash ﬂow basis) than their high-productivity competitors. The report
connects this to problems of separation of powers between the federal center and regional
authorities: “The sector-level market distortions result from unequal laws and enforcement,
originated in most cases by regional or municipal authorities in the absence of clear laws
and/or strong control mechanisms at the federal level.”
This paper attempts to provide consistent microfoundations for this picture. In doing
so, we do not explicitly model the dynamics of transition from a command economy to
the current federal structure characterized by powerful regional elites and a relatively weak
center. Instead, our model highlights the importance of initial conditions. One general
message is that federalism does not work without rule of law, supported either by strong
independent courts and grass-root traditions (U.S. or Great Britain) or a powerful central
authority (China). In China, the term ’provincial protectionism’ is sometimes applied to
protection of one province against another province, such as erecting trade barriers across
provinces. Our main idea is relevant to this situation as well: It is the relative weakness of
the federal center that allows governors to erect trading barriers, and it is the rents that can
be extracted inside the province that gives governors incentives and resources to erect these
barriers despite the center’s ﬁght for a common market.
One may argue that the view of the federal center as a benevolent, although imperfect,
social planner is far more generous than it should be.2 In this paper, our analysis is focused on
the dark side of federalism, i.e. the perverse incentives that separation of power between the
center and regions create, rather than on a full evaluation of the performance of federalism
in transition countries.3 Obviously, the same impossibility of the federal center in providing
2Prudhomme (1995) and Tanzi (1996) analyze such dangers of decentralization as the inability of con-
stituent units to take part in an economic stabilization policy pursued by the federal government.
3While in the Russian case provincial protectionism turns out to be a negative phenomenon, it is not uni-
versally negative. It might be argued that the ability of the Guangdong province to protect itself against the
central government of China has been a crucial determinant of its economic success (e.g., Stiglitz and Qian,
1996). The theoretical model below might be used to explore potential beneﬁts of provincial protectionism
4correct incentives to regional ﬁrms directly, which lies at the core of our model, is a major
motivation for the existence of separation of powers as suggested by Hayek (1945).
The “protection federalism” works as follows. Governors of rich regions having high
political support choose to protect their enterprises from paying federal taxes. Lack of
means precludes the federal center from eﬀective policy towards these regions. In the region,
the governor’s aversion to cooperate with the federal center provides bad incentives for most
proﬁtable regional ﬁrms: they do not pay federal taxes, and bribe governors in exchange
for protection. There are more restrictions on the entry of new ﬁrms, and thus lower social
welfare, than in an equilibrium without protection. As a result, federal tax non-payments
(arrears) are concentrated in regions with large productive enterprises, and the political
strength of the governor accounts for accumulated tax arrears. Though we concentrate on
tax collection in the subsequent analysis, similar consideration apply to other issues, where
provincial authorities are able to subvert operation of a federal authority. For instance,
OECD (2000) report states that in 1998, Russian provincial governments underfulﬁlled the
25 most important federal expenditure mandates by roughly 30 percent (see also Litwack,
2003).
At the regional level, governors are strong in those regions where there are few large enter-
prises that do not compete heavily with each other (i.e. belong to diﬀerent industries). The
basic starting point is that one can obtain a huge rent from enterprises by protecting them
from intra-regional competition and the federal center. This allows the provision of transfers
to bad enterprises, thus maintaining political power, and thus maintaining bargaining power
with large ﬁrms. The governor might oppose the entry of new (proﬁtable) ﬁrms since they
may reduce his rents via competition, and may provide political support to his political
rivals. If there are few strong enterprises in a region, the governor’s protection for these
enterprises against the federal center leads to more restrictions on entry to the intra-regional
market. Such a situation might cause additional disincentives for enterprise management to
restructure and pay taxes, since it becomes more costly for governors to control a restruc-
tured (or taxpaying) enterprise. Recent work by Slinko, Yakovlev, and Zhuravskaya (2003)
veriﬁed empirically predictions of our model: in Russia, large and ineﬃcient ﬁrms beneﬁt
as well.
5from preferential treatment, and the capture has adverse eﬀect on small-business growth.
The same study supports our prediction that size concentration in regional industry makes
regional capture more likely.
The phenomenon of provincial protectionism is not conﬁned exclusively to Russia. Tomassi,
Saleigh, and Sanguinetti (2001) say about Argentina: “The non-cooperative behavior among
provincial governments has also aﬀected the collection of national taxes... This has occurred
through very generous and poorly controlled regimes for industrial promotions ... [under
which] exemptions from major national taxes can be allocated. ” In ﬁve provinces (Cata-
marca, La Rioja, San Luis, San Juan, and Tierra del Fuego), authorities can legally postpone
payment of major federal taxes for a period of up to ﬁfteen years!
Based on Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Berkowitz and Li (2000) model the situation that
government agencies of diﬀerent levels can unilaterally levy taxes on the same tax base, as
documented in Shleifer and Treisman (1999). Our model demonstrates how such a mecha-
nism might work when tax rights are clearly deﬁned.4 Namely, the possibility of avoiding or
delaying payments (e.g. through capture of bankruptcy, see Lambert et al, 2000) leads to
competition of federal and local authorities over the ﬁxed tax payments that accrue to the
federal center, thus again exhibiting properties of a ’tragedy of the commons’. Shleifer and
Treisman (1999) identify this phenomenon and derive implications without a formal model.
While an OECD (2000) report acknowledges a number of serious improvements in Russian
ﬁscal federal arrangements, the main problem remains to make such arrangements work in
an appropriate way.
Litwack (2003) analyses relationship between the Russian federal and regional govern-
ment within a multi-task principal-agent framework. Treisman (1999) considers Russian
regions involved in Tiebout-like competition in political protection for enterprises. There
is both theoretical and empirical evidence that multi-regional corporations have advantages
in obtaining regional protection. A remaining problem that we try to touch upon here is
how such competition might inﬂuence a governor’s incentives to suppress/promote economic
development in his region. The most recent empirical investigation of federal tax arrears in
Russia is Ponomareva and Zhuravskaya (2000). Earlier studies include Alfandari and Schaf-
4Berkowitz and Li (2000) assume from the very beginning that there are several independent tax agencies.
6fer (1996), Ivanova and Wyplosz (1999), Schaﬀer (1998), Treisman (2000). Lambert et al
(2000) suggest an explanation for why the federal center is unable to collect tax payments
from regional enterprises. Frye and Shleifer (1997) and Frye and Zhuravskaya (1999) report
ﬁndings on regional over-regulation and bribery. McKinsey (1999) was a major source of
evidence for the current paper. Empirical ﬁndings of Zhuravskaya (2000) and Alexeev and
Kurlyandskaya (2003) allows us to treat, at least at the ﬁrst approximation, the Russian
government as two-tier, although it is three-tier formally. Eﬃciency losses due to decen-
tralization are analyzed in Inman and Rubinfeld (1997), McKinnon and Nechyba (1997),
Sanguinetti (1994), Jones, Sanguinetti, and Tommasi (1999), and Rodden (2000). Chapter
11 in Roland (2000) provides theoretical framework for study of federalism in transition
economies. Blanchard and Kremer (1997) and Qian, Roland, and Xu (2000) emphasize
the role of initial conditions in explaining the diﬀerent transition paths between China and
Russia.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the setup of the model.
In Section 3, we discuss comparative statics in regional equilibria. Section 4 analyses federal
equilibria of the model. Section 5 describes federalism, Russian style, which we use as a
motivating example. Section 6 concludes.
2A M o d e l
In this model, there are the federal center, regions, regional ﬁrms and regional politicians.
In each region, ﬁr m sh a v ec a s hﬂows and tax obligations to the federal government. They
decide whether or not to pay these obligations out of current cash ﬂows and/or whether or
not to seek the governor’s protection from the federal government5 and the intra-regional
competition. The governor protects ﬁr m s ,t a k e sp a y m e n t sf r o mt h e m ,a n dl o o k st o w a r d
re-election. Employees of ﬁrms constitute a part of electorate, and each additional ﬁrm
entering the market brings some votes for the governor. Regions might diﬀer with respect
to the size of population that are not employed in ﬁrms, the ’unattached voters’, and the
5Lambert-Mogiliansky et al (2000) observes the similarity between the federal government and outside
creditors, such as Moscow-based banks for Russian regions, in this respect.
7potential output of their ﬁrms.
In each region, the there is a mass s of ﬁrms that can potentially enter the regional
market. Firm i’s taxable proﬁt πi(s) d e p e n d sb o t ho nt h ei d e n t i t yo ft h eﬁrm and is aﬀected
by the level of regulation s, 0 ≤ s ≤ s. Following Shleifer and Vishny (1993, 1998) and
Djankov et al (2002), we treat regulation at the regional level as a restriction on entry, and
so assume that s is both the regulation parameter and the number of ﬁrms entering the
market. Therefore, each ﬁrm’s taxable proﬁt decreases with the number of ﬁrms s operating
in the market, πi = πi(s), with π0
i < 0,π 00
i > 0. A textbook Cournot oligopoly with a
ﬁnite number of ﬁrms satisﬁes these assumptions: the proﬁto fe a c hﬁrm decreases with a
decreasing rate with the number of ﬁrms in the market. For simplicity, we assume that ﬁrms
are ordered with respect to their taxable proﬁts,
∂πi(s)
∂i < 0 for all s.
The governor decides on the number of ﬁrms that can operate in the regional market,
s. If s ﬁrms entered, the governor receives v(s) votes directly, v0(s) > 0,v 00(s) < 0.F i r m s
that have entered the market have tax obligations to the federal center, a share t of proﬁts.6
However, tax enforcement is imperfect. Each ﬁrm determines whether or not to pay federal
tax obligations. If ﬁrm i, which has a gross proﬁto fπi, decides to pay taxes, the ﬁrm’s
pay-oﬀ is (1−t)πi. If the ﬁrm decides not to pay, its pay-oﬀ is (1−t+(1−β)t)πi, where β
is a parameter reﬂecting the bargaining power of the governor against the ﬁrm. So, if β<1
(and we conﬁne our analysis to this case) any ﬁrm prefers not to pay taxes.
In this paper, protection from the federal center means that the enterprises being pro-
tected are allowed not to pay taxes that they owe to the center. However, there is nothing
s p e c i a la b o u tt a xa r r e a r sa sb e n e ﬁts provided by the regional administration at the expense
of the central government. A subsidy to a loss-making enterprise or other favors given out
of a deﬁcit budget would have the same implications.
Firms pay the governor for protection, and the governor uses these means to get re-
elected. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that his only goal is to increase his chances of
keeping the oﬃce. Similarly, we assume that though the governor can restrict competition
6We do not consider any regional taxes. Instead, it is implicitly assumed that a governor can use regional
taxes to receive payments from ﬁrms. Shleifer and Treisman (1999): ”To avoid sharing taxes with the federal
government, regional governments also wrote oﬀ the regional tax obligations of local companies in return for
public services they provide”.
8(e.g., imposing huge entry costs for new ﬁrms), he does not collect any entry payments
from ﬁrms.7 Alternatively, one might assume that the governor establishes a ﬂat entry fee,
and only ﬁrms with after-tax proﬁts exceeding this fee enter the market. In our analysis,
we normalize this fee to zero. A governor may choose the extent of his cooperation with
the federal center, and thus the level of protection for those ﬁrms that do not pay taxes.
Speciﬁcally, he decides on whether or not to protect a ﬁrm from paying the federal taxes.
For each ﬁrm protected, he bears a political cost, with the monetary equivalent of p. If the
number of ﬁrms could be restricted so that βtπ0(s) >p ,then it is worth it for the governor
to protect some ﬁrms from paying federal taxes. Summing up, the governor has the following
problem:
max
0≤s≤s, 0≤k≤s
½
V = γ(βt
Z k
0
πi(s)di − pk)+v(s)
¾
,
where γ is the ’political exchange rate’, which converts money into votes. For instance, if
the region has a lot of unemployed workers (unattached voters), then γ is high. Similarly,
the higher is the level of political competition in the region (the stronger is the intra-regional
opposition to the governor), the lower is γ. One might interpret 1
γ a st h e‘ p r i c eo fv o t e s ’
in the region. At the cost of simplicity, one may make γ endogenous. Though additional
insights of such an extension seem to be limited, we discuss this possibility later.
The federal center’s main goal is simply to increase tax collection, given tax rate t.I n
Russian reality, there are three basic types of federal policy: direct control over ﬁrms that
do not pay taxes, involvement in the regional political process, and transfer policy. With the
latter, the center can motivate governors by determining transfers to regions conditional upon
their performance. In our model, there is one parameter reﬂecting the center’s inﬂuence over
ar e g i o n ,p, the cost of protecting a ﬁrm from federal claims, and one parameter reﬂecting
the strength of the political opposition to the governor, γ.
The federal center can aﬀect the cost of protection for the governor of region q, pq, by
spending scarce ﬁnancial resources. Let T be the amount of resources available to the center.
On the one hand, T is the total amount of taxes collected by the federal center, T. On the
other hand, T is the amount spent by the federal center on control of governors, T =
P
q c(pq),
7Deﬁnitely, small ﬁrms pay a lot of bribes to overcome extensive regulation. However, these bribes are
collected for the most part by low-level bureaucrats.
9where c(pq) is the cost of maintaining the level of control of governor q at pq. In the next
section we analyze incentives an individual governor faces and so treat the parameter p as
exogenous. Analyzing interaction at the federal level in the subsequent section, we ﬁrst give
a formal description of the game governors play against the center, and then incorporate
regional-equilibrium results into a more broad picture.
3 Regional Equilibrium
A Politician and Many Firms
First, we analyze what happens at the regional level. Before proceeding to the formal analysis
of the ﬁrst-order conditions for the governor’s maximization problem, we note that if the
governor chooses not to protect a ﬁrm from paying federal taxes, he has no incentives to
restrict competition at the regional level (i.e. to choose s<s). In particular, the governor
cannot protect any ﬁrms provided that
γβtπ0(0) <p .
In this case, his optimal choice is free entry to the regional market, s∗ = s. The simple
condition above gives meaningful comparative statics. Incentives to have competition sup-
pressed are weaker if he faces strong political competition within his region (γ is low), has
insuﬃcient bargaining power versus ﬁrms (β is low), and the cost of protection imposed by
the federal center is high (p i sl a r g e ) .A ni n c r e a s ei nt h et a xr a t e ,t, makes protection more
attractive as it increases the beneﬁts the governor receives without aﬀecting his costs. An
important, though straightforward, result is that larger proﬁts of regional enterprises (here,
π0(0)) make protection from the federal center more attractive. This is the ﬁrst illustration
of the idea that incentives to restrict local competition and incentives to protect enterprises
from the federal center are mutually reinforcing.
If the governor chooses some level of competition at the regional level, s, and some
level of protection against the federal center, k, the number of votes he receives is V =
γ(βt
R k
0 πi(s)di−pk)+v(s). Increasing the number of ﬁrms entering the regional market has
t w oc o u n t e r v a i l i n ge ﬀects: ﬁrst, each additional ﬁrm brings v0(s) more votes to the governor’s
10column; second, the proﬁts of ﬁrms that have already entered the market diminish by π0(s).
The governor is willing to protect a ﬁrm against the federal center as long as his share in the
taxes of the ﬁrm being protected exceeds the cost of protection, p. Since each ﬁrm’s proﬁt
is aﬀected by the level of regulation, the governor faces the following trade-oﬀ:i n c r e a s i n gs
brings more votes directly, but makes protectionism less attractive.
The ﬁrst-order conditions at an interior point are
−βt
Z k∗
0
∂πi(s∗)
∂s
di =
1
γ
v
0(s),
βtπk∗(s
∗)=p.
To ensure the second-order conditions hold, we assume that γβt
R k∗
0
∂2πi(s∗)
∂s2 di+v00(s) < 0.
In essence, this assumption means that the rate with which the total proﬁto fﬁrms being
protected decreases with s exceeds the growth rate for the direct political support to the
governor. If this assumption does not hold, e.g., if v(s) is linear in s, the results will be
no less meaningful: In this case, the governor either protect all the ﬁrms that entered the
market, or allows all ﬁrms to enter the regional market and protects none of them.
The right-hand side of the ﬁrst of the ﬁrst-order conditions shows that it is employment
relative to political competitiveness that matters: Indeed, if political opposition is weak,
votes are cheap to the governor, and he is less interested in receiving support from promoting
competition (allowing more ﬁrms into the market). If political competition is very strong (γ
is close to zero), money is not important for the governor, and hence he has fewer incentives
to protect ﬁrms from the federal center. We summarize the above discussion in the following
proposition. (A formal proof is relegated to Appendix.)
Proposition 1 A governor has more incentives to protect regional ﬁrms from paying federal
t a x e s( c h o o s e sal a r g e rk∗) and more incentives to restrict entry at the local level (chooses a
smaller s∗), the higher is the bargaining power of the governor with respect to large enterprises
(β is large), the higher is the tax rate t, the lower is political competition inside region (γ is
high), and the higher is political attachment of voters (the slope of v0(s) is higher).
These comparative statics results deserve additional discussion. One important ﬁnding
is that if proﬁts of large ﬁrms are low than the governor has fewer incentives to restrict entry
11to the market. This is a simple illustration of the Blanchard and Shleifer (2000) paradigm.
In China, at the beginning of transition, there were very few ﬁrms that earned large rents
in the absence of competition. In Russia, many regions had enterprises with high cash ﬂows
and large employment, and it is their rents the governors protect from competition both in-
and outside the region.
The cost of protection, p, reﬂects the governor’s ability to protect ﬁrms in his region.
The federal center can impose a cost on the governor in various ways. For example, it
might use local oﬃces of federal enforcement agencies to enforce payments of taxes. The
next proposition describes how the regional equilibrium changes if the cost of protection
of regional enterprises from the federal center increases. A higher p forces the governor to
reduce the number of ﬁrms protected from the federal center for two reasons. First, with a
higher cost of protection, the least proﬁtable of large ﬁrms are no longer protected. Second,
t h er e l a t i v ev a l u eo fs m a l l - ﬁrm employees for the governor increases, and he becomes less
willing to sacriﬁce competition for rents of the protected ﬁrms.
Proposition 2 An increase in the cost of protection from the federal center, p, provides
the governor with more incentives to enhance intra-regional competition (s∗ increases), and
fewer incentives to protect large ﬁrms from the federal center (k∗ decreases).
In Lambert et al (2000) and Ponomareva and Zhuravskaya (2000), an index that reﬂects
the relationship between governors and the federal center, compiled by the investment com-
pany MFK Renaissance, appears to be a signiﬁcant determinant of the number of governor-
controlled bankruptcies and the size of tax arrears, respectively. Also, the latter paper
ﬁnds that regional enterprises have more tax arrears when regions have higher bargaining
power vis-a-vis the federal center (that is, lower p) and higher GRP per capita. The above
proposition provides an explanation for this common phenomenon in Russian regions.
Instead of trying to raise the cost of protection, p, for the governor (using regional
branches of federal agencies, or suing governors in courts), the federal center often directly
helps alternative candidates, or at least threatens to do so. In many local elections, the
involvement of the federal center kept incumbents with high chances of being re-elected oﬀ
the ballots.
12Proposition 3 The thresholds k∗ and s∗ separate regional ﬁrms into three sets: ﬁrms i, with
i<k ∗, enter the regional market, do not pay federal taxes, and bribe the governor; ﬁrms
with k∗ ≤ i<s ∗ enter the regional market and pay federal taxes; ﬁrms with s∗ ≤ i ≤ s do
not enter the regional market.
In particular, Proposition 3 implies that an individual enterprise’s tax non-payments
a r em o r el i k e l yt ob eh i g hi fi th a sh i g hp r o ﬁt and/or high employment. (To evaluate the
eﬀect of employment on the likelihood to be protected, we assumed that if a ﬁrm has excess
employment, it is waived a part of the protection fee. Details are provided in the Soft
Budget Constraint section.) For Russia, the implications of this proposition are supported
by data: the reported median productivity of ﬁrms with tax arrears is 60.75 (mean, 133.62)
bln rb/worker compared to 34.43, the median productivity of all ﬁrms in RERLD (mean,
75.59) in 1997, as reported in Ponomareva and Zhuravskaya (2000). (The 1996 data were
53.96 (mean, 126.24) compared to 30.74 (mean, 68.01).) Tax arrears at the end of 1997 were
signiﬁcantly higher for ﬁrms with high cash ﬂows at the beginning of 1997; and are higher
for enterprises with high employment.
To compare two regions endowed with diﬀerent industrial structures, we characterize
them by two families of functions: πA =( πAi(s))i,s and πB =( πBi(s))i,s.T h i sa l l o w su st o
see what happens if one region (region A in the following proposition) has more proﬁtable
enterprises than another (region B).
Proposition 4 8Suppose that the level of intra-regional competition, s, is ﬁxed and the same
for both regions, and suppose that πAi(s) ≥ πBi(s) for all i, 0 ≤ i ≤ s. Then the governor of
region A chooses to protect more enterprises and receives more votes, than the governor of
region B. Region A accumulates more unpaid taxes to the federal government.
The key assumption in the above proposition is not as restrictive as it may seem: it
basically says that for any given level of proﬁts, region A has more enterprises with proﬁts
exceeding this level than region B.In this case, total proﬁts of ﬁrms in region A a r ea tl e a s ta s
large as total proﬁts of all ﬁrms in region B. It is not unexpected that governors of generally
richer regions have more room for protection of their enterprises. It is a more cumbersome
8A proof of this Proposition is relegated to the Appendix.
13task to single out the eﬀect of industrial concentration, since there are countervailing forces
in place. An increase in industrial concentration may have two eﬀects: one is that increased
proﬁts of ﬁrms would allow the governor to protect more ﬁrms; the other is that increasing
concentration below the protection threshold p does not directly force the governor to protect
more ﬁrms from the center, but reduces his willingness to restrict local competition, and so
the overall eﬀect is the opposite.
Governors, Strong and Weak
In a region, the governor may be either strong or weak, as measured by the number of votes
collected (in equilibrium) at the regional election:
V (s
∗,k
∗)=γ(βt
Z k∗
0
πi(s
∗)di − pk
∗)+v(s
∗).
Our theory suggests that the main determinant of the potential strength/weakness of the
governor is the industrial structure of his region. If there are several large enterprises with
high cash ﬂows that are not competing with each other (e.g., being local monopolies in
diﬀerent industries) and a large number of ’unattached voters’ (γ is high), it is likely that
the governor would be strong. If the regional enterprise compete heavily in the market (and
thus to extract rent from them it is necessary to exclude their competitors), they are likely
to seek protection from diﬀerent candidates, and whoever the winner is, he is potentially
weak.
Formally, when a governor is strong? Any governor is trading-oﬀ votes he receives from
promoting competition for votes he buys on the market. The less severe is this trade-oﬀ,t h e
stronger is the governor. To study this in a formal setup, we simplify the general model as
follows. Suppose that there is a share a of ’large’ enterprises, each of which has a proﬁt π(s),
which depends on the number of ﬁrms that entered the regional market. All other ﬁrms
have taxable proﬁto f0. As above, π(s) is decreasing in s, and π00(s) > 0. So, the governors
faces the same trade-oﬀ as in the general model: increasing s means more votes, but less
rents. One advantage of this simpliﬁed model is that the governor either protects all the
large enterprises from the federal center, if the optimal s∗ is such that βtπ(s∗) ≥ p, or does
not protect any enterprise at all.
14To compare two regions endowed with diﬀerent industrial structures, we characterize
them by two functions: π1(·) and π2(·). To deal with industrial concentration, we adopt a
simple assumption that a1π1(s)=a2π2(s) for all s, a1 <a 2, while other parameters being
the same. So, region 1 has a more concentrated industry, than region 2: a smaller mass of
enterprises in region 1 earns the same total proﬁt as a large mass in region 2. First-order
conditions yield that s∗
1 <s ∗
2, that is, in the region with more concentrated industry, the
governor prefers less competition. The intuition behind this proposition is clear. At the
same cost, the governor of the region with a more concentrated industrial structure could
extract more rents and buy more votes. For this governor, intra-regional competition poses a
smaller threat than for the governor, where proﬁts of the ﬁrms fall quickly with the number of
competitors. Slinko et al (2003) found empirically that in Russian regions size concentration
does increase the likelihood of state capture, which in turn leads to lower collection of the
federal taxes.
Proposition 5 The more concentrated is the industrial structure of the region, the fewer
ﬁrms are allowed into the regional market and the more are unpaid taxes to federal govern-
ment.
The same logic allows to identify the cases when the governor is strong. His value function
is now
V =m a x {max
0≤s≤s
{γ(βatπ(s) − p)+v(s)},v(s)}.
As above, the industrial structure of the region is characterized by the function π(·).
Furthermore, we assume that π(s)=a − bs, a,b > 0 and v(s)=sα, 0 ≤ α<1, and
1 ≤ a/b ≤ s. Let s∗ denote the unconstrained maximizer of V (s)=γ(βt(a − sb) − p)+sα,
i.e. let s∗ satisfy the condition γβtb = α(s∗)α−1. First, we consider the situation, when
V (s∗) >V (s)=v(s). This might be the case only if s∗ is such that a − s∗b ≥
p
tβ, since
V 0(s) <v 0(s) for all s<a / b .Then
s
∗ = s
∗(α)=(
α
b
)
1
α−1.
The smaller is α, the higher is the number of votes the governor receives. Moreover, there
exists some e α>0 such that for any α<e α,
ds∗(α)
dα < 0. Intuitively, smaller α means that each
15entering ﬁrm brings more votes at least unless s =1ﬁrms entered, and our assumptions
assure that s∗ < 1. The comparative statics with respect to b is also meaningful: higher
value of b imply higher value for s∗ = s∗(b) and lower value for V (s∗).
Now consider the opposite situation: V (s∗) <V(s)=v(s). In this situation, the governor
does not protect any ﬁrms from the federal center. First, we note that for any given industrial
structure, if the potential market s is large enough, the governor opts for s = s. The cost
of protection p aﬀect the number of votes only in the case if ﬁrms are protected from the
federal center. The number of votes decreases with p until a−sb = p, a n dt h e nt h eg o v e r n o r
switches to s = s.
This argument allows us to identify two types of situations when governors are strong:
First, when a is large, b is small, and α is close to zero: these governors have a small number
of highly proﬁtable enterprises and votes are relatively cheap for them. In other words, the
more concentrated is the industry, the larger is the share of the governor’s votes that comes
from the ’unattached’ voters (that cost γ to him), and the lower is the share that comes
from the ’attached’ ones. The second type of strong governors appears in regions, where the
number of potential entrants (s) is large. In other words, those governors are strong that face
a less severe trade-oﬀ between supporting entry of new ﬁrms and decreasing proﬁts of those
that have already entered. The following Proposition summarizes the above discussion.
Proposition 6 Suppose that the governor protects ﬁrms from the federal center. The gover-
nor is stronger, the larger is a (industry concentration), the smaller is b (price of the votes),
and the smaller is α (elasticity of votes with respect to eﬀorts to promote competition) pro-
vided that α is suﬃciently close to zero.
This logic has a further extension. Now suppose that the ’price of votes’, γ, is endogenous
and depends negatively on s∗, that is the more enterprises are protected by the governor, the
less votes are up for sale by the unattached voters. The parameter γ might be a proxy for
the employment of those enterprises in the region that can not provide political support for
a candidate in any organized way. A strong governor has a lot of money from the protected
enterprises and buys cheap votes. If enterprises were free to choose a protector, enterprises
under the governor’s control would have little incentives to support other candidates. A
16strong position allows the governor to protect the enterprises from the federal center, thereby
increasing their rents and campaign contributions, and maintain monopoly power of these
enterprises. Therefore, this situation is self-sustainable: strong position allows to extract
rents and increase probability of re-election, which in turn makes the position even more
secure. A weak governor provides little protection to enterprises, which in turn provide
him with little bribes (campaign contributions). Thus, the governor relies on employees
of his protected enterprises, rather than on buying non-attached votes. This in turn allows
enterprises to switch from one candidate to another (especially, if we consider a ﬁnite number
of enterprises). The set of parameters that supports that kind of equilibrium assumes high
s∗ (or k∗ relative to α).
Summing up, the total payments for protection are high when (i) there are a lot of
proﬁtable ﬁrms in the region; (ii) the governor is strong. The strength of the governor as
proxied by the number of votes he received in the last elections allows him to provide more
protection to the regional enterprises. Ponomareva and Zhuravskaya (2000) ﬁnd that the
governors that have higher winning margins in past elections tend to provide more protection
to ﬁrms, and thus their regions maintain higher amounts of tax arrears.
Protection and the Soft Budget Constraint
If all enterprises had the same proﬁt, it is reasonable to expect that the governor’s choice
would be to support ﬁrms that have higher employment. To address this issue, we focus on
the governor’s choice between ﬁrms with heterogenous employment. If one ﬁrm could deliver
some extra votes to the governor, there would the possibility of politicians-and-ﬁrms-type
play between the governor and each ﬁrm (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). Formally, suppose
that a ﬁrm that has ∆L of excess employment has a pay-oﬀ of π(s) − w∆L, where w is the
region-wide salary. The ﬁrm might suggest to the governor the following deal: it maintains
the excess employment, delivering the additional ∆L votes to the governor, but pays a bribe
b instead of βtπ(s). The governor accepts this oﬀer as long as γb + ∆L ≥ γβtπ(s).9 For
the ﬁrm, it is proﬁtable to maintain excess employment of ∆L and pay b to the governor
9In this section, we always assume that βtπ(s) >p ,and so the governor prefers to protect, rather than
to let the ﬁrm to pay taxes.
17if tπ(s) − b − w∆L ≥ (1 − β)tπ(s). This trade is possible if and only if 1
γ ≥ w. Here, 1
γ
is the governor’s marginal beneﬁt of excess employment. If the political opposition in the
region is strong (γ is small), than additional employment is more important for the governor.
Thus, stronger political competition in a region may well provide managers of enterprises
with perverse incentives. For comparative-statics purposes, assume that the governor and the
enterprise share the extra surplus equally (this corresponds to the Nash bargaining solution).
Then
b
∗ = βtπ(s) − ∆L(
1
γ
− w),
and so to have higher bribes, the governor has incentives to restrict competition (reduce s).
Clearly, the higher is the excess employment a ﬁrm maintains, the less money the governor
receives.
The same story might be told about entry to the regional market. The possibility of
using excess employment instead of bribes makes it possible that ﬁrms that are less proﬁtable
(and have lower labor productivity) enter the regional market, while more proﬁtable ﬁrms
are driven out. Here, protection against intra-regional competition may also be viewed as a
ﬁne imposed on value-creating ﬁrms. McKinsey’s (1999) report on Russia states that as a
result of subsidies to troubled enterprises, “ﬁnancially sound companies end up paying taxes
and energy bills ‘for themselves and the other guy”’. Formally, we state this in the following
proposition.
Proposition 7 Regional protectionism provide managers with incentives to maintain excess
employment (soft-budget constraints). Stronger political competition leads to more excess
employment.
The problem might become much more severe if a ﬁrm’s internal cost of keeping excess
labor is wf <w ,i.e. is below the region-wide wage rate.10 The reason is that provision of
social goods (which might attach workers through in-kind payments as suggested in Friebel
and Guriev, 2000) often involves huge ﬁxed costs, which at the beginning of transition were
already sunk for old soviet enterprises. Proposition 7 demonstrates ﬁrms’ disincentives to
10Friebel and Guriev (2000) imply that this internal cost of maintaing employment might be much lower
for the ﬁrm than the wage rate.
18restructure: if restructuring assumes layoﬀs, as is often the case, the ﬁrm loses (a part of)
its bargaining power. Given the contribution of the protected ﬁrms, the governor prefers
them to have as many employees as they can accommodate, thus reducing productivity. An
important ingredient in this result is that enterprises control the votes of their employees.
Large command-economy-type enterprises especially have low wf : in the above model, this
both increase the likelihood of bribe-for-votes exchange and and the rents of both parties.
Here is where the result of political decentralization may promote soft budget constraints
for managers, instead eliminating them as in Qian and Roland (1998). With provincial
protectionism, less productive ﬁrms might be kept in the market, while more productive
are rejected access.11 The McKinsey report (1999) ﬁnds that one of the main operational
reasons for persistent low productivity in Russia is excess employment maintained in old
ﬁrms. The output of old companies fell by 50 percent, while employment fell by only 20
percent. McKinsey estimates that 10 percent of workers on average are redundant, while
another 20 percent are currently stranded in non-viable operations. The report says that
“These inequalities [in competition] tend to favor low productivity incumbents, protecting
them from takeovers and productive new entrants. These policies are often put in place to
achieve social objectives, namely protecting existing jobs, but in many cases, the suspicion is
that they also serve the personal ﬁnancial interests of government oﬃcials in collusion with
businessmen.”
4 Federal Equilibria
To analyze general-equilibrium aspects of regional protectionism, we consider a game that
regions non-cooperatively play against the federal center and each other. Here our emphasis
is not on the standard coordination failure, where all regions choose to protect themselves
from the federal center, but on the mechanism that translates protection against the federal
center into governor’s incentives to suppress intra-regional competition. In the previous
11Chinese experience tells us that if entering ﬁrms use new technology such that their proﬁts are very
high compared to those of incumbent ﬁrms, governor’s incentives to suppress entry might be reversed (e.g.,
Stiglitz and Qian, 1995).
19section, we studied this mechanism at the regional level. Now we turn to the provinces vs.
the federal center game.
The game is played as follows. First, the governor of each region chooses a level of his
relation to the center, i.e. whether or not to provide protection for regional ﬁrms. Second,
observing the governors’ policy, the federal center determines its policy toward regions, i.e.
pi for all i ∈ I. For simplicity, we treat these pi is ex-post punishments, expected by the
governors at their decision node. Furthermore, we maintain the assumptions made above:
there is a share a of ’large’ enterprises, each of which has a proﬁt π(s),a n da l lo t h e rﬁrms
have taxable proﬁto f0.π (s) is decreasing in s, and π00(s) > 0. Here we are interested in
sub-game perfect Nash equilibria of the game.
In a generic case, parameters are such that there exists two stable equilibria, one with
all regions cooperating with the federal center, and one with regions maintaining high level
of protection for their enterprises. First, we consider the case when the federal center has
enough resources to punish violators, when needed. Any of these policies, i.e. money spend
on increasing the probability of a particular enterprise to be caught avoiding tax payments
or/and support of local politicians who are friendly to the federal center, makes the good
equilibrium stable. Since the federal center can commit its resources to ﬁghting any governor
who deviates from a good equilibrium, no governor would ﬁnd such a strategy attractive.
Suppose that all provinces are identical, and let s∗ be the governor’s optimal choice. We
need to consider two cases. First, suppose that the governor opts to protect enterprises
from the federal center, that is −βtπ0(s∗)=v0(s∗) and π(s∗) >p . Then, there are no
revenues in the federal budget, and thus the cost of protection for the governor is zero. If
protection is costless, any governor chooses to protect enterprises rather than not, so this
is a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. Another case arises if there exists a punishment
p such that π(s∗(p)) <v (s) and c(p) < (N − 1)tπ(s). The right-hand (revenue) side is
the sum of the N − 1 provinces tax receipts. The inequality shows that the center has
enough means to prevent the Nth governor from protection his ﬁrms, and thus there is a no-
protection equilibrium. The term π(s) appears in this inequality, since if the governor does
not protect enterprises from the federal center, he has no incentives to suppress intra-regional
competition, and so s∗ = s. De Figueredo and Weingast (2001b) conclude that "a necessary
20condition for a stable federalism is that the center must be strong enough to detect and
punish potential shirkers." The fact that the federal center can use resources obtained from
other regions to ﬁght a defector and thus sustain the no-protection equilibrium shows that
the constituent units have incentives to coordinate for collective action against the center. In
Russian experience, the governors of regions put a lot of eﬀorts to coordinate their ﬁght with
the federal centers. In many situations, it was the position of governors, who had a legislative
power at the federal level as the members of the upper chamber of Russian parliament, that
does not allow the federal center to punish some governors.12 In any case, whether or not
the province-coordination eﬀect is taken into account, these two equilibria highlight the two
distinguished possibilities: either there is an economy, where large enterprises do not pay
taxes, and small enterprises are driven out of the market, or there is an economy, where
taxes are paid and thus there is no need to suppress competition.
Proposition 8 For a generic set of parameters, there is an equilibrium with high intra-
regional competition and little protection from the federal center provided by the governors,
and enterprises paying their obligations to the federal center. This equilibrium is charac-
terized by p such that π(argmax{βtπ(s) − v(s)})) <v (s) and c(p) < (N − 1)tπ(s). Also,
there is an equilibrium with all governors protecting their proﬁtable enterprises from federal
tax payment and restructuring (−βtπ0(s∗)=v0(s∗) and π(s∗) >p .). In such a ’protection’
equilibrium, governors support less competitive environment in their regions.
Now the regional-level analysis carried through in the previous sections provides condi-
tions that make the equilibria more or less likely.
As we argued above, the protection equilibrium might be supported by the coordination
eﬀect. Having scarce resources, the federal center could not ﬁght all regions at the same
time. This potentially suggests some policy implications: to eliminate the coordination
problem, the federal center should concentrate resources on ﬁghting protectionism of a few
regions, instead of dispersing resources between all regions. Carreaga and Weingast (2001)
12The current reform of the federal system in Russia started from changing the way the upper chamber of
the parliament is formed. Now it is ﬁlled with (non-elected) representatives of regions, which are subordinated
both to the governors and regional legislative chambers, and are believed to be much more dependent on
the federal center than the former senators, the governors themselves, were.
21analyze the successful federation-building strategy by the Mexican government after 1930.
Sequential involvement of provinces in more close cooperation with the federal center has
been an essential part of this strategy.
What Makes a Federalist System Work?
Blanchard and Shleifer (2000) argue that it is the lack of political centralization that is re-
sponsible for Russian federalism failure compared to that of China, where the federal center
is relatively strong. If the federal center has enough resources or a way to employ the exist-
ing resources more eﬃciently, the problem of provincial protectionism would be overcome.
Indeed, if the federal center has enough administrative resources to punish those governors
that allow enterprises to avoid tax payment, governors would have to rely more on economic
performance (either by increased provision of public goods or diminishing regulation) in or-
der to gain votes. Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2003) ﬁndings empirically support the above
argument. Technically, if the federal center has a more cost-eﬀective technology of ﬁghting
provincial protectionism, the less possible is the bad equilibrium. In an extreme case, the
center need not rely on the coordination mechanism to combat regions: this is the case
there exists p such that π(s∗(p)) <v (s) and c(p) <t π (s) (instead of a more loose condition
c(p) < (N − 1)tπ(s), which allows the governor to exploit the coordination problem).
Proposition 9 The stronger is the federal center (e.g. the less costly is increasing pi), the
less likely is the protection equilibrium. If the central authority is strong enough, then there
is no protection equilibrium at all.
At the same time, there are countries, where eﬀectiveness of federalism rely on strength
of local institutions rather than on power of a central authority (Inman and Rubinfeld,
1998). At least historically, USA is an example of such a country. Technically, if the
governor is forced to increase s (intra-regional competition) this provides him with less
incentives to protect ﬁrms from the federal center. Indeed, if the governor is unable to
suppress competition and extract bribes, allowing for more competition becomes a more
attractive choice. Although incentives to protect regional enterprises from the federal center
remain, they are weaker than otherwise. This might explain why the phenomenon of regional
22protectionism is much less important for US, than for other federal countries. To analyze
ability of governors to suppress local competition, we add one more parameter.
Proposition 10 Suppose that there is a monetary cost m(s) associated with restricting
intra-regional competition, m0(s) < 0,m 00(s) > 0. The smaller is the governors’ ability
to suppress intra-regional (industrial) competition (the steeper m(s)) ,t h em o r eu n l i k e l yi s
the protection equilibrium.
A similar message could have been inferred from Proposition 1, which shows that a higher
level of political competition inside the region leads to more competition and less protection
against the federal center. This gives the federal center an additional instrument for dealing
with the governors: the federal center might support governor’s rivals, or try to reduce his
chances for re-election, e.g. by using the federal prosecutor oﬃce.
5 Federalism, Russian Style
Russia has been a federal state since 1992, with 89 sub-federal units (regions). What makes
Russian federalism an attractive choice for investigation? Russia provides the possibility for a
unique case study: its federalist system started from scratch in 1992, and so initial conditions
are easily observable, and the whole development is well-documented. Also, understanding
t h en a t u r eo ft h i sd e v e l o p m e n tm i g h tbem o r ef r u i t f u lt h a ni nas i m i l a re n q u i r yi n t ot h en a t u r e
o fam o r em a t u r ef e d e r a l i s ts y s t e m ,s i n c ep o l i c yr e f o r m sm i g h th a v em u c hm o r ep r o f o u n d
impact. As Djankov and Murrell (2002) say about transition economics in general: ”With
changes in the institutional and policy environment much faster and more encompassing than
in virtually any other historical episode, this is as close to a policy laboratory as economics
gets.”
What are the speciﬁc features of Russian federalism that distinguish Russia from other
federal states? First, it is a unique industrial structure, with its large (and thus politically
powerful) loss-making enterprises (Ericson, 2000, Roland, 2000, Shleifer and Triesman, 2000,
Triesman, 1999). Second, it is the weakness of the federal center and the absence of Russia-
23wide political structures.13 Third, as noted above, it has a short history, and has experienced
rapid changes recently.14
Since the beginning of transition in 1992, the Russian federalist system has changed a lot
(in 1991-1993, the regional governments’ share of total taxes increased from 35 percent to
more than 55 percent). In 1992-1994, empowering regional political powers and eliminating
central government’s direct control of regional enterprises was a part of the new Russian
leadership’s strategy during the initial period of reforms. (On this, see Shleifer and Treisman,
2000.) Ericson (1999) describes the whole process at the regional level as follows: ”... the old
political elites, and enterprise and farm managements, have largely succeeded in entrenching
themselves in both new and surviving economic and political organizations, where they have
been joined by a small group of new elite that was able to seize wealth and control of assets in
the early wild period of 1989-1993... Licensing and regulatory restrictions site new business
initiatives, unless initiated by an elite insider, and existing small and medium business is
looked on as a source of continuing rents to be extracted through micro-regulation of activity,
multiple fees, and creative taxation by local and regional elites.”
Since 1995, the federal center has paid more attention to the economic incentives the
federalist system provides. An OECD survey (2000) states: ”relatively stable and uniform
rules for division of revenue and ﬁscal authority have replaced the chaotic bilateral bargaining
and conﬂicts of earlier years.” Most recently, the Russian government has put an emphasis
on additional strengthening of the federal center relative to regional powers.
One particular problem of Russian federalism is regional protectionism. The same OECD
report states that “the case of Russian Federation involves the gross violation of virtually
all of these conditions [deﬁning a market-preserving federalism], while economic policies
13Before the collapse of the Soviet Union (the state successing the Russian Empire and preceding Russia),
there was a unique country-wide political structure, the communist party. Management of each enterprise
was directly controlled by the central planning agency (Gosplan) and the party committee of this enterprise.
Nowdays, the communist party still has a nation-wide structure and a solid electoral support, but its role as
a centralizing force seem to be almost negligible.
14It seems possible to extend the logic of provincial protectionism - industrial structure of sub-units
determining their relationship with the center - to explain the endogenous disintegration of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union in late 70s - early 80s, that is before Gorbachev’s reforms. However, this is clearly
outside the scope of this paper.
24have a reported anti-reformist orientation in many regions.” There are a number of recent
papers reporting opportunistic behavior by local Russian politicians in their relations with
the federal center (e.g., Treisman, 1999, Lambert et al, 2000), and local business (Frye and
Shleifer, 1997, Frye and Zhuravskaya, 1999).15 Litwack (2003) notes that "the various tools
and schemes for supporting informal substantial regional and local budgets include extensive
bilateral bargaining with large ﬁrms for the direct provision of goods and services in return
for various beneﬁts, such as tax exemptions, loan guarantees, protection from competition or
bankruptcy, debt restructuring, cheap energy inputs, assured safety and supplies of utilities,
and freedom from inspections and ﬁnes." One empirical fact is that in Russia, huge federal
tax arrears have been accumulated by large and productive enterprises in strong regions
with governors having huge electoral support (Ponomareva and Zhuravskaya, 2000). The
same study ﬁnds that local tax agencies make more eﬀorts to collect taxes owed to local
authorities rather than the federal center.
An important element of provincial protectionism is subversion of courts, which are for-
mally independent, by regional governors. As a case-study in institutional subversion, Lam-
bert, Sonin, and Zhuravskaya (2000) analyze empirically the causes and consequences of
bankruptcies in Russia, and conclude that bankruptcy proceedings are subverted by gover-
nors. After a bankruptcy procedure starts, a governor uses his inﬂuence over the regional
judiciary to appoint management controlled by the regional administration. The second
observation is that ﬁr m st h a tg oi n t ob a n k r u p t c ya r en o ti n e ﬃcient in the technical sense
(measured by labor productivity) and many of them have a very high cash ﬂow. Speciﬁcally,
more than 30 percent of ﬁrms have higher costs per ruble of output and about 50 percent of
ﬁrms have lower labor productivity than the median ﬁrm where a reorganization procedure
has started. Furthermore, ﬁrms being restructured are distributed unevenly across indus-
tries. About 80 percent of externally managed ﬁrms’ output is produced by ﬁrms in three
industries: oil and gas (54.5), chemical (9.4), and ferrous metallurgy (16.5). For compari-
son, the output of all ﬁrms in these industries accounted for 30 percent of total industrial
output. Firms under external management produced 24 percent of output in the oil and gas
15Chapter 6 of Shleifer and Treisman (2000) is the most comprehensive and thorough analysis of Russian
federalism’s performance .
25industry. Industries in which external management procedures are more frequent are the
best-performing in terms of cash ﬂows and technical eﬃciency.
Slinko et al (2003) provides an analysis of empirical predictions of our model. Unlike
previous analysis of state capture in transition economies, which was based for the most part
on surveys, Slinko et al (2003) employ data on preferential treatment at the regional level.
In line with our predictions, a key ﬁnding is that capture of regional governments by large
and ineﬃcient enterprises has adverse eﬀect on small-business development and federal tax
collection.
Blanchard and Shleifer (2000) note that Gasprom, a natural gas monopoly eﬀectively
controlled by the central government, plays the role of a unionizing structure in the absence
of strong party system. The McKinsey report (1999) shows the limits to this argument: In
the steel and cement, and confectionery industries, which were case studies in the report, it is
found that regional governments often channel implicit federal energy subsidies to companies
by letting arrears to federal suppliers accumulate at the local gas and electricity distribution
companies. The key ingredient for this scheme to work smoothly is that local energy distri-
bution companies are often under the eﬀective control of regional governments. (As noted in
Lambert et al, 2000, local energy companies were a prime target of regional administrations
in many governor-controlled bankruptcy cases.) The report concludes that "these subsidies
slow down recovery in many manufacturing sectors by preventing upgrading investments and
industry consolidation in and around the viable industrial assets". Thus, though Gasprom
or United Energy Systems play a centralizing role, their role brings additional ineﬃciency
to regional markets.
6C o n c l u s i o n
Some general insights might be derived from our analysis. Stability and performance of a
federalist system is aﬀected by the industrial structure of constituent units. If local au-
thorities ﬁnd it proﬁtable to protect enterprises from paying federal taxes, they have more
incentives to restrict intra-unit competition to accumulate more rents. Via a coordination
eﬀect, such a situation is made self-sustainable. The same logic applies in the case of starting
26a federalist system. If the initial rent-holders are strong, the country is likely to end up with
a form of peripheralized federalism, and this system is likely to be unfriendly to economic
development. The main source of stylized facts for our analysis was Russian and China,
although insights obtained here might be applied as well to explain federalism performance
in such countries as Argentiana, Brazil, and Mexico.
One problem with our story is that it, unlike most traditional federalist theories, does not
explicitly assume resource mobility. However, it does provide insights for an environment
with mobile factors. Indeed, in a bad equilibrium, enterprises have few incentives to move to
another region, since in other regions competition is also suppressed. Treisman (2000) builds
a federalist theory, assuming from the very beginning that provinces compete in protection
from the federal state. Our model allows us to study inter-regional competition in protection
and obtain results similar to Treisman (2000). An important advantage of our model is that
our story allows us to make the governor’s choice of whether or not to protect enterprises
endogenous.
Blanchard and Shleifer (2000) argue that Russia’s (as compared to China’s) transition
story proves that political centralization matters for a federal structure to be eﬃcient (as
was suggested by Riker, 1964). In this paper, we demonstrate that the industrial structure
inherited from Soviet times undermines political centralization in Russia and precludes fed-
eralism from providing correct incentives to politicians, both local and central, and managers
of industrial enterprises. In contrast, in China, political centralization reduces regional ad-
ministration incentives to protect ﬁrms from the federal center. At the same time, there is no
incentive to reduce market competition, since there are no large local monopolies to extract
rents from. In Russia, there are disincentives to soft-budget constraint elimination, since a
ﬁrm might use excess employment as a substitute for a payment for protection. Since excess
employment is likely to be in old enterprises, governors keep old enterprises and restrict
entry of new ones.
Alesina (2003) (see also references therein) analyses determinants of size of countries and
i t sr o l ei ne c o n o m i cd e v e l o p m e n t .I ti sa r g u e dt h a tam a j o rc o s to fi n c r e a s i n gt h es i z eo fa
countries is heterogeneity between the (would be) constituent units. Our analysis is compli-
mentary to this insight: in the short-run, our logic suggests that the industrial structure of
27provinces determine their political structure and relationship with the federal center. How-
ever, there is little doubt that in the long-run the inﬂuence of the industrial structure on the
political structure is not one-way. For an example related to our main story, recent stud-
ies of China’s industry cite negative inﬂuence of emerging provincial protectionism. China
Security Commission Report to the US Congress (2002) considers provincial protectionism
(which is a manifestation of the center’s inability to eﬃciently oppose emergence of trade
barriers across provinces) as a major obstacle to China’s eﬀorts to fulﬁll its World Trade
Organization obligations. Although our model does allow to analyze dangers of these de-
velopments, it does not provide a formal study of federalism dynamics, which is a topic for
future research.
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30APPENDIX
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .T h eg o v e r n o r ’ so b j e c t i v ef u n c t i o nm i g h tb ew r i t t e na sf o l l o w s :
V (s,k;γ,β,t,p)=γ(βt
Z k
0
πi(s)di − pk)+v(s),
where s,k are choice variables, and (γ,β,t,p) is a vector of parameters. We claim that
the function V is quasisupermodular in (−s,k) and satisﬁes the single-crossing condition in
(−s,k;γ,β,t,−p). (See Milgrom and Shannon, 1994, for deﬁnitions and characterizations.)
T os h o wt h i s ,w en o t et h a tf o ras m o o t hf u n c t i o nπi(s), ∂2V
∂s∂k =
∂πk(s)
∂s < 0, ∂2V
∂s∂γ = ∂2V
∂s∂β =
∂2V
∂s∂t =
R k
0
∂πi(s)
∂s di < 0. Also, ∂2V
∂k∂γ = ∂2V
∂k∂β = ∂2V
∂k∂t = πk(s) > 0, and ∂2V
∂k∂p < 0. Finally, ∂2V
∂s∂p =0 .
This is suﬃcient to claim that the function V is quasisupermodular in (−s,k) and satisﬁes
the single-crossing condition in (−s,k;γ,β,t,−p). Now Theorem 4 at Milgrom and Shannon
(1994) yields all our comparative statics results. (Conditions on the choice set structure are
satisﬁed trivially.)
Finally, if v1(s) is steeper than v2(s),t h eﬁrst-order conditions for the problem imply
that s∗
1 <s ∗
2, and the results above yield k∗
1 >k ∗
2.¥
Proof of Proposition 4. We use the following simple fact: For any p>0, if functions
f,g,h are such that f0 >g 0 > 0, f00,g00 < 0,f (0) ≥ g(0),h 0(x) > 0,h 00(x) < 0, then
x
∗
f =a r gm a x {f(x) − h(x)} >x
∗
g =a r gm a x {g(x) − h(x)}
(provided that both x∗
f and x∗
g exist), and f(x∗
f) − px∗
f >g (x∗
g) − px∗
g. To prove Proposition
4, we observe that the above conditions are satisﬁed for f(k)=βt
R k
0 πAi(s)ds and g(k)=
βt
R k
0 πBk(s)ds. Indeed, f0(k)=πAk(s) >g 0(k)=πBk(s) > 0 and f00(k),g 00(k) < 0 since we
assumed that ﬁrms are ordered with respect to their proﬁts.¥
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